2 However these results have also been the focus of much skepticism, since, as we noted before, it is difficult to see how spillovers of the size their estimates imply might work at business cycle frequencies. Our results indicate that the skepticism was justified: output spillovers do not in fact work at these frequencies. Thus, our results suggest that business cycle models based on "strategic complementarities" or multiple equilibria are, like the aggregate demand-driven models of Weitzman (1982) and Kiyotaki (1988) , more plausibly based on pecuniary externalities than on short-run technological spillovers.
The paper is structured in five sections. In the first section we describe our method for detecting externalities. In Section II, we examine the biases that result from using value-added data. In Section III, we discuss the data we use. We present and discuss our empirical results in Section IV. We then conclude with a brief summary. The theory behind our investigation follows closely the setup of Caballero and Lyons (1990a , 1990b , 1992 . The discussion here parallels that found in their papers.
I. Method for Finding
We begin with the following production function for an industry:
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perceived by the firm. Note that the price of capital, PK, must be defined as the rental cost of capital. 
Y is gross output (not value added). K and L are primary inputs of capital and labor, while M is intermediate inputs of energy and materials. Z is an externality index, and T is an index of the state of
technology. We assume that the production function is homogeneous of degree y in capital, labor, and intermediate goods. y is thus the degree of internal returns to scale.
We allow firms to have some degree of monopoly power in the goods markets, though we assume that they are price takers in factor markets. We assume also that firms act as if they face a sequence of one-period static problems; this abstracts, for example, from any considerations of dynamic monopoly or investment behavior. Under these assumptions, the first-order conditions for profit maximization imply that the elasticity of output with respect to any factor J equals a markup p multiplied by the share of that input in total revenue, sa,:
Rearranging equation (3), we find Y .
PjK + PLL + P
.
PY

S Revenue
Y
Costs cost"
[FJ P p y-j ps J,
P is the price of gross output, F, is the marginal product of input J, and P, is the price of the ith input as
Thus, if the markup exceeds the degree of returns to scale, the firm or industry makes positive profits.
If the markup equals the degree of returns to scale, the firm makes zero profits.
Note that unless the profit rate is constant, then it cannot be the case that both p and y are constant structural parameters. We assume that returns to scale y is the structural parameter, and implicitly allow ' This procedure assumes that capital services are always rented in the quantity desired. If, however, capital is quasi-fixed (sunk in the short run) then the marginal product of capital does not equal its rental rate but rather its shadow rental. That is, the user cost of capital in the Hall-Jorgenson formula (equation (13)) should be multiplied not by the price of investment goods, which is the usual procedure, but by the shadow value of capital, marginal q. (The shadow rental also includes expected capital gains.) This problem is not significant, for two reasons. First, as argued, quasi-fixity of capital affects only the period-by-period computation of the input shares, not the growth rate of capital (or any other input). Since these shares are constant to a first-order Taylor approximation, any errors caused by failure to track the movements of the shares is likely to be small. Second, the mismeasurement of the rental rate of capital has its strongest effect on capital's share. But since the growth rate of capital is almost uncorrelated with the business cycle, errors in measuring capital's share are unlikely to cause significant biases in a study of cyclical productivity. Caballero and Lyons (1990) present simulations indicating that maximum biases from quasi-fixity are likely to be on the order of 3% of the estimated coefficients. the markup to vary over time and over industries, as required by equation (3). Define c 1 to be the share of input J in the total cost of industry i. From equations (2) and (3), the output elasticity with respect to input J is ps, = '.
Taking the logarithmic total differential of Y and substituting for the output elasticities, we find: Following their method, we investigate the importance of externalities across two-digit manufacturing industries. We then look for external effects in these industries from the one-digit level, aggregate manufacturing. Caballero and Lyons (1990a) and Bartelsman, Caballero, and Lyons (1993) advocate estimating the following regression: dy = y fvIX+K x+ du,.
(6) dx is the aggregate input growth rate, where the growth rates of the inputs are appropriately weighted by their cost shares. That is, dx is the analogue, at the aggregate manufacturing level, of the sectoral input growth rates dx,. This serves as a natural proxy for aggregate manufacturing output, dy. It mitigates the potential endogeneity problem, however, that arises from the direct influence of sectoral technology shocks on aggregate output.
Of course, there is still an endogeneity problem, coming from the probable correlation between sectoral technology shocks and sectoral input use; input use probably rises to take advantage of the higher level of productivity. So if one has suitable instruments, the correct procedure is to project the right-handside variables on instruments that can be argued to be exogenous with respect to shocks to technology.
I, The Biases from Using Value Added Data
The proper measure of output for estimating equations such as (6) is gross output. 
Equation ( Sato (1977) or Arrow (1974) .
If there is competition and constant returns to scale, then the growth rate of value added equals the growth rate of primary inputs plus technological progress. That is,
One implication of equation (11) In principle, we can estimate equation (10) directly. Non-linear estimation then provides estimates of internal returns to scale y, the markup of price over marginal cost p, and the size of any external effects.
By estimating this equation, we can confirm the empirical importance of the two misspecifications we identify above.
It is inconsistent, however, to estimate this equation by constraining both the markup and the degree of returns to scale to be constant over time, as we discussed in Section I. As before, we eliminate this inconsistency by using equation ( 
1-sy
Equation ( We do not face the same problems as Caballero and Lyons in our estimation, because we do not use value-added data. As we discuss in the next section, we instead use data on gross output by 2-digit Caballero and Lyons's argument for including the price of oil seems to assume that their valueadded data are single-deflated. We do not interpret the inclusion of the oil price this way, because their data is double-deflated, not single-deflated.
Productive Externalities Page 14 manufacturing industry. The discussion in this section provides an explanation for differences in results using gross-output data and using value-added data. In particular, it is apparent that the use of valueadded data may lead to a spurious finding of external effects. This is the Tornquist approximation to the continuous-time Divisia index in equation (7).
As discussed in Section I, there is a clear argument for using instrumental variables in estimating equation (5). Good instruments are of course hard to find. We follow Hall (1988) and Ramey (1989) , and use the political party of the President, the growth rate of real military spending, and the growth rate of the world dollar price of oil. We also include a lag of each of these variables. Of the three variables, '* The 50 types of depreciable capital, along with their estimated geometric depreciation rates, are listed in Jorgenson (1990) , "
The typical industry appears to have an average postwar profit rate of about 5 percent in our estimates. We experimented with several alternative measures of the capital cost. For example, following Hall (1990) we assumed a constant depreciation rate of 12.7 percent for all assets. We also used data on non-asset-specific measures of ITC and d, obtained from Alan Auerbach. These adjustments had no important effect on our results. This is unsurprising, since they affect the overall estimated level of profits, but have little effect on the cyclical properties of the estimated cost-of-capital series.
, s=I1to 52.
(1 -v) (13) the price of oil has the greatest correlation with the right-hand-side variables; it is also the most questionable. Hall (1990) argues in its favor, on the grounds that input prices do not shift production functions. It is not enough, however, that the production function at a point in time be unaffected. In estimating equation (6), we are explicitly focusing on how the production function changes over time; for this rate of change to be unaffected by input prices, we require that technological progress be Hicksneutral. With this assumption, the price of oil is a valid instrument.
IV. Results and Discussion
In this section we present our major empirical results, and discuss their implications.
We reach three main conclusions. First, using gross-output data from 1953 to 1985, we find no evidence of spillovers. Second, using our constructed value-added data, we find large apparent spillovers. Thus, with different data, we reproduce the Caballero-Lyons stylized fact that there is a strong positive correlation between aggregate inputs and industry productivity calculated from value added. Third, by augmenting data on value added and primary inputs with data on intermediate inputs, we essentially recover the gross output results with value-added data, including the finding of no positive externalities. This is an important result because it shows that many of the failures of value added come from the source we identify: specification error caused by the existence of imperfect competition. Tables 1-4 . In all of the tables, we constrain internal returns y and external spillovers i to be the same in all 21 industries. Allowing internal returns y to vary across industries barely affects our estimates of K, the variable of primary interest here, so we do not report those results. In Table 1 we report the results using both the quality-adjusted and the non-quality-adjusted data.
The results are presented in
As we see, the two types of data give essentially identical results. Therefore, in the remaining tables we present only the results using the preferred quality-adjusted data. In no case are our conclusions altered by the quality adjustment.
We report all regressions both instrumented and uninstrumented. If one has complete confidence
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Page 18 in the instruments, then the instrumented results are clearly preferable. There are two potential shortcomings to the instruments we use, however. First, even if one has complete confidence in the exogeneity of the instruments, there may be small-sample problems. Nelson and Startz (1990) show that using exogenous instruments that fit poorly may lead to substantial small sample bias (where "small" may, in fact, be large relative to the data sets used by macroeconomists.) They consider a single-equation single-variable setup, but to us their work suggests a more general concern: we are trying to disentangle the effects of two highly correlated variables (industry and aggregate inputs) from their projections onto the same set of relatively poor instruments. Second, the only instrument with any significant correlation with inputs is the price of oil. And this is the most questionable instrument, because of the possibility that technological progress is not Hicks-neutral. Hence, for comparison, we also report the uninstrumented results.
All regressions include unreported industry-specific constants and dummy variables that allow a trend break in productivity growth after 1973. We include the post-73 dummy in response to recent work of Perron (1989) and others, who suggest that allowing for a one-time change in slope after 1973 provides a useful empirical specification for modelling trends. The post-73 dummies are generally highly significant, but none of our substantive conclusions depend on their presence. Focusing first on the estimate of returns to scale, we find essentially constant returns. Adjusting for quality, however, returns to scale are slightly smaller: instrumented, with quality-adjusted inputs, we estimate that y is about 0.96. This is just smaller than 1 at the 95 percent level of significance: the confidence interval includes 0.99. Since the quality of inputs has grown over our sample period, taking this fact into account shows that some of the output growth incorrectly attributed to increasing returns is actually a consequence of increasing input quality.
Turning to K, the parameter of primary interest here, in Table I we find no evidence of positive output spillovers across industries. In all cases we find that K is essentially zero: the average K is -0.02. In the one case where K is positive it is insignificant, and in the one case where it is significant it is negative.
In Table 2 , Panel A, we show the same regressions as in Table 1 , but using our constructed value-added data as the measure of output. These results differ markedly from the gross-output results. This is particularly striking because the value-added data are constructed from the same data set that we used for the gross-output regressions. Hence, we control for the myriad small differences in sources and methods that make it difficult to compare results from different data sets.
Using these value-added data we find small estimates of y, consistently on the order of 0.6. This accords with our prediction in Section II that the estimate of y from a value-added regression is biased downward. For reasons we discuss below, estimates of internal returns on the order of 0.6 are too small to be believable. Turning to K, the spillover parameter, we find that in our value-added data K is large and significant-both t-statistics exceed 4. This contrasts with the results in Table 1 , where K was never both positive and significant.
In Table 2 We now confirm that our explanation for the failure of value added is the correct one. Equation (12) of the difference in results is the omission of materials growth as a right-hand-side variable. If our explanation is correct, then by estimating equation (12) we should get exactly the same Y' s as in Table   I and K's that are about twice as large." (The reason that K should be larger is given in equations (10) or (12): with value added, the effect of the externality is scaled up by a factor of 1/(1-sM). In the data, sM is on the order of 0.5-0.6 over our sample period.)
We estimated equation (12) by non-linear least squares using both our value-added data and the NIPA data. In Section II, we identified two separate misspecifications with value-added data. Here we ask which of these misspecifications has a greater empirical effect. In Table 4A , we correct for the first problem only: the fact that dx' should be multiplied by (1-cM)/(1-sM). In Table 4B we correct for the second problem only: we include the omitted materials growth term as required in equation (12).
Comparing the results with those of Table 3 shows that the omission of the materials term is quantitatively more important. This fits our theoretical prediction, since profit rates are relatively small, and
(1-cM)/(1-sM) is not very cyclical. This conclusion holds for both data sets.
We view our findings as methodologically significant. They show not only that gross-output data gives results quite different from results with value added; they also confirm empirically our predictions about why value added is inappropriate. But our methodological findings should not overshadow the significance of our substantive results. We find that internal returns to scale are roughly constant, but certainly not strongly decreasing as the value-added results suggest. Most interestingly, we find no evidence of positive, contemporaneous spillovers from aggregate activity. Apart from these considerations, a y that is significantly less than I is internally inconsistent with the assumed monopolistic-competition framework (or, indeed, with any form of profit maximization).
Note from equation that unless (4) profit rates are huge (which in the data they are not), a y of 0.6 or even 0.8 implies that the markup of price over marginal cost, p, is less than 1 --i.e. firms sell output below marginal cost. This conclusion is independent of any possible externalities and gives perhaps the strongest reason for doubting these low estimates of Y.
Our results with gross-output data, however, seem quite reasonable. In terms of economic significance we find constant returns to scale. With the profit rates we calculate, this implies a small but significant markup: prices are on the order of 5 percent above marginal cost. This calculation is, however, sensitive to an accurate computation of profit rates. The profit rates we compute are particularly low (sometimes negative) in the 1970s. Here it is possible that our required payments to capital are too high because we do not account for capital losses on existing plant and equipment following the oil price shocks.'' As an alternative strategy, we estimate equation (10) by NLLS to get a direct estimate of the markup, p. (Assuming that both y and p are constant is equivalent to assuming that the true profit rate is a constant.) We find p to be about 1.15, implying prices about 15 percent higher than marginal costs.
Hence the implied markup and profit rates from these two procedures range between 5 and 15 percent: a strong indication of imperfect competition, but small enough to be plausible.
Turning to the part of Caballero and Lyons's findings that has excited a great deal of interest in "6 This is consistent with the observation that the stock market was depressed but investment was high following the oil price shocks. See the discussion in note 2. A finding of contemporaneous spillovers of 0.10 or smaller, whose presence is highly sensitive to the type of data, the estimation technique, and the precise sample period, is probably not very significant economically. For this reason, we conclude that internal returns to scale are about constant, and external effects from contemporaneous aggregate activity are probably not present.
Conclusion.
In this paper, we provide an explanation for the stylized fact that regressions using value-added data in two-digit manufacturing appear to imply large productive spillovers to output. We show why, in the presence of imperfect competition, the use of value-added data will likely cause one to find large apparent externalities, even if such externalities do not in fact exist.
Using theoretically-preferable gross-output data, we find no evidence of output spillovers. When we construct value-added data, however, we find large apparent spillovers. We then augment data on value added and primary inputs with data on intermediate inputs in the way our theoretical specification requires; we again find that spillovers are non-existent. This confirms our conjecture that the misspecifications of value added we identify as a matter of theory are actually responsible for the differences in results.
The specification errors we identify have an important implication: value-added data is not appropriate for estimating structural parameters, except with competition and constant returns. Hence, our critique applies equally to the work of Hall (1986 Hall ( , 1988 Hall ( , 1990 Note that the difference between the double-deflated index (16) and the Divisia index (7) is the weights used to subtract materials growth from output growth. The double-deflated index calculates the weights using constant base-year prices, whereas the Divisia index calculates the weights using current prices.
With some algebraic manipulation, we can show that the growth rate of the double-deflated index of value added equals the growth of the Divisia index, plus an additional term:
The second term in equation (17) is the double-deflation bias. As Bruno (1978) and Bruno and Sachs 
